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1. Introduction
The IPO market is a natural place to examine aggregate inves-
tor behavior following a large, discrete stock price change, since 
the average IPO has a first day return of between 10% and 20% 
(depending on the time period examined). The cause of the large 
initial returns is not well understood. Some suggest that the large 
initial returns result from initial undervaluation, in which case the 
first-day return simply reflects an adjustment from the offer price 
to the fundamental value. Others suggest that initial returns re-
flect investor overreaction to new information on the first day of 
trading.1
Ritter and Welch (2002) document that positive first-day re-
turns are followed by long-run underperformance. One explana-
tion is that negative long-run returns are the result of overreac-
tion to new information on the initial day of trading: Overreaction 
drives prices above fundamental value, but in the long-run prices 
converge to fundamental value, and the long-run abnormal re-
turns (excluding the first-day return) are negative.2
However, negative long-run returns can be attributed to in-
vestor overreaction only if one knows that the IPO was not ini-
tially overvalued. Recent work by Purnanandam and Swamina-
than (2004) suggests that IPOs are actually overvalued at issue by 
as much as 50%. In light of this statistic, one cannot attribute neg-
ative long-run returns to post-IPO investor overreaction, since the 
negative returns may simply result from initial overpricing.
We contribute to the study of post-IPO investor overreaction 
by studying the long-run return properties of a unique set of 221 
thrifts that converted from the mutual to stock form of ownership 
between 1993 and 2000. When thrifts convert from mutual to stock 
ownership, the original owners (depositors) lose their ownership 
rights and their entire claim on pre-conversion equity is trans-
ferred to the IPO investors at no cost.3
Thus, the new shareholders have ownership rights that include 
all IPO proceeds plus all of the pre-conversion market value of 
the thrift. In contrast, the new shareholders in a typical IPO have 
a claim on only a proportion of the pre-conversion market value. 
If we assume positive pre-conversion market value, then by con-
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1 We do not equate “underpricing” with the initial return, as is commonly done in the literature. We refer to first day returns as such, and use the 
term “underpricing” only to refer to situations where the IPO price is known to be below the firm’s fundamental value (described in more de-
tail below).
2 Ritter and Welch (2002) suggest it may also reflect a failure to adequately control for firm characteristics.
3 Prior to conversion, mutual thrift depositors are fixed claimants with apparent ownership rights to residual equity. However, Smith and Under-
wood (1997) discuss that although the residual profits of a mutual thrift belong collectively to depositors, they are individually unable to ex-
ercise their rights as equityholders. In other words, mutual depositors are unable to withdraw the mutual thrift’s residual profits. If the thrift 
converts to a stock organization using the sale-of-stock method, depositors have priority in purchasing shares in proportion to their deposited 
assets. Depositors who choose not to purchase shares are no longer owners but simply fixed claimants with no ownership rights.
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struction the converting thrift IPO is underpriced. In other words, 
it is not possible for the valuation to be “correct” since IPO inves-
tors always receive assets (IPO proceeds plus pre-conversion mar-
ket value) worth more than the IPO proceeds. Peter Lynch once 
remarked that from the perspective of the IPO investor, this was 
equivalent to buying a house, moving in, and finding the seller had 
left the sale proceeds in the house for the buyer to keep (Wilcox and 
Williams, 1998). Many investors understand ex ante that this under-
pricing exists and is unique to thrift demutualizations, although the 
exact magnitude is not observable. It is not a feature of standard 
IPOs, bank IPOs or insurance company demutualizations.
The following example illustrates how the built-in underpric-
ing is unique to mutual-to-stock thrift IPOs. Assume two thrifts 
that are identical except one is privately held and one is organized 
as a mutual. Without loss of generality, assume the private firm 
has 100,000 shares; mutual thrifts do not have ownership shares. 
Further assume that both firms have $500,000 of book value eq-
uity prior to their IPO and that both firms will raise capital by sell-
ing 400,000 shares to outside investors. The key difference is that 
the new shareholders of the mutual thrift have a claim on all pre-
conversion equity while the new shareholders of the private thrift 
have a claim on only a proportion of pre-conversion equity.
The current owner of the private thrift owns all 100,000 shares 
and will sell 400,000 new shares (80% of the company) for expan-
sion resulting in 500,000 shares after the offering. Investment bank-
ers assist the owner in determining the market valuation of the 
company and estimate the post-conversion market value to be ap-
proximately $5,000,000; the IPO is fairly priced by setting the issue 
price at $10 per share. This means the company will collect approx-
imately $4,000,000 when the shares are sold (less investment bank-
ing fees), and the tangible per share book value of the firm will rise 
from $5.00 prior to the IPO to $9.00 after.4 Moreover, assuming that 
the estimated market value of $5,000,000 is correct, the post-conver-
sion per share market value equals the initial price of $10.
The mutual-to-stock IPO involves selling 400,000 shares at the 
IPO price of $10, with stock proceeds (less fees) of approximately 
$4,000,000. In contrast to the private-to-stock conversion, the orig-
inal owners (depositors) have no shares in the converted firm and 
are effectively stripped of their claim on pre-conversion equity. 
The pro forma tangible book value per share following the IPO is 
$11.25 which represents an immediate increase of $1.25 or 12.5% to 
new shareholders. A post-conversion market value of $5,000,000 
results in a share price of $12.50, and the IPO is therefore under-
priced at issue by approximately 25%. In other words, a mutual-
to-stock thrift conversion results in a direct transfer of wealth to 
new shareholders at the expense of the original owners (depos-
itors). In fact, as long as the pre-conversion market value of the 
firm is positive at the time of conversion, Colantuoni (1998) dem-
onstrates that the IPO will be underpriced and a transfer of wealth 
will occur regardless of the IPO offer price.
The above example illustrates why we know the average issue 
is not overpriced and why our sample of firms is uniquely suited 
to test for investor overreaction. For example, since negative ab-
normal returns can occur only after price rises above fundamen-
tal value, any negative long-run risk-adjusted returns observed 
in our sample must result from investor overreaction to informa-
tion at some point after the IPO, assuming the thrift was solvent 
prior to conversion. In particular, negative long-run returns rela-
tive to the first-day closing price indicate investor overreaction on 
the initial trading day. In contrast, if investors initially underreact 
to information, all long-returns will be positive when measured 
relative to the first-day closing price. Overreaction after the initial 
trading day will produce negative returns only during the later, 
post-issue sub-periods when prices correct.
We find that our sample of converting thrifts demonstrates 
large first day excess returns of 17.9%; however, even the large 
magnitude of this initial return need not imply investor overre-
action or initial underpricing. Thus, we examine post-IPO cumu-
lative abnormal returns (which exclude the large initial return) to 
gauge whether investors overreact on the day of the IPO. We find 
positive cumulative abnormal returns over the first 12 months 
following the IPO, but negative cumulative abnormal returns at 
all horizons longer than that. The results suggest that investors 
overreact on the initial day and possibly during the subsequent 
12 months of trading, which is consistent with the results of Pur-
nanandam and Swaminathan (2004).
If prices eventually converge to fundamental value, any overre-
action must be followed by negative sub-period returns during a 
corrective phase. Therefore, analyzing sub-period returns provides 
insight into the specific timing of overreaction and subsequent cor-
rection. We examine returns over 6 month sub-periods for 5 years 
post IPO, looking at both market adjusted excess returns and alphas 
from the various factor models mentioned above. Excess returns are 
significantly positive for the first 6 months after the IPO, and ap-
proximately zero in the subsequent 6-month period. This suggests 
that overreaction continues for approximately 6 months beyond the 
initial day of trading. It is worth emphasizing that although inves-
tors overreact during the first 6 months of trading, nearly all of the 
overreaction occurs on the initial day of trading.
However, within 12 months following the IPO, the average 
thrift begins to experience a price correction or mean-reversion to-
wards fundamental value, as measured by negative excess sub-
period returns. This correction lasts for approximately 18 months, 
after which time the sub-period excess returns are approximately 
zero. Thus, the thrifts in our sample appear to go through a cy-
cle of overreaction and subsequent correction after the IPO. The 
initial day of trading, as well as the first 6 months after the IPO, 
are characterized by investor overreaction. Prices stabilize dur-
ing the following 6-month period then begin a correction process 
which lasts about 18 months. We also examine differences in risk-
adjusted returns. While the statistical significance of these results 
is somewhat weaker, they also demonstrate that the long-run ab-
normal returns are negative, and that the poor performance is 
concentrated in the second and third years following the IPO. In 
addition, the return differences are most pronounced among the 
smaller thrifts in the sample.
Our study is among the first to examine the long-run perfor-
mance of these converted thrifts in detail5 and is similar to recent 
4 This represents an immediate increase in pro forma tangible book value of $4.00 per share to the existing shareholder and an immediate dilution 
of $1.00 per share to new shareholders. Thus, new shareholders are investing approximately $1.00 in the present value of growth opportunities 
of the thrift. While smaller in magnitude, this is consistent with the results of Chung et al. (2005) who document that a large percentage of the 
IPO offer price reflects the present value of growth opportunities.
5 Two exceptions are Ritter (1991) and Houge and Loughran (1999), though neither of those studies analyzes the returns for thrifts separately from 
other financial institutions. Ritter (1991) documents long-run overperformance over a 3-year holding period for financial institutions (banks 
and thrifts) that went public during the period 1975–1984. In contrast, Houge and Loughran (1999) found that a sample of banks and thrifts that 
went public from 1983 to 1991 significantly underperformed over a 5 year holding period. In addition, initial thrift returns have been examined 
by Pettigrew et al. (1999) and Wilcox and Williams (1998). Maksimovic and Unal (1993) study the relation between IPO pricing, first-day re-
turns, and depositor and insider purchases, and find that greater insider ownership predicted higher initial returns. Esty (1997) and Kroszner 
and Strahan (1996) examine regulatory incentives to convert to stock form. Unal (1997) looks at the appraisal process and how it relates to ini-
tial IPO windfall gains. Masulis (1987) looks at probability a firm will convert as a function of thrift size, recent growth and non-interest income. 
Cole and Mehran (1998) study the performance of converted thrifts before and after expiration of anti-takeover amendments.
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work by Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), who interpret 
empirical data from standard IPOs in light of various behavioral 
models. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) examine the pre-
market, first day and long-run performance of a large set of IPOs. 
They find that relative to industry peers, the median IPO is over-
valued at the offer by about 50% relative to its industry peers. 
Moreover, the most overvalued IPOs earn the highest first day re-
turns, and experience the most severe subsequent long-run per-
formance. Relative to IPOs that are initially underpriced, the IPOs 
most initially overvalued earn first day returns that are 5–7% 
higher, but earn 20–40% lower returns over the next 5 years. Their 
results suggest that the widely documented long-term IPO under-
performance may be attributable to both the initial overvaluation of 
the offerings, followed by further post-issue price increases that 
eventually reverse over the long-run. The authors interpret their 
evidence as being consistent with initial investor overreaction to 
information (measured by the initial overvaluation of the IPO), 
followed by additional subsequent overreaction (large positive 
first-day returns), and long-term mean-reversion (long-term un-
derperformance). This interpretation is consistent with the empiri-
cal predictions of Daniel et al. (1998).
While their study addresses several important questions, it 
raises others. First, it is unclear that overpricing in the pre-market 
can be interpreted as the type of investor overreaction modeled in 
Daniel et al. (1998). This is because the pre-issue pricing mecha-
nism differs from the open market pricing mechanism: The initial 
offer price is set by the issuer and underwriter, and only indirectly 
represents investor demand. If the issuer miscalculates investor 
demand, or faces incentives that affect the offer price, the pre-of-
fer pricing mechanism may not accurately represent aggregate in-
vestor demand. One advantage of our sample is that the pre-issue 
pricing mechanism for thrifts is highly transparent. The initial val-
uation pricing formula is regulated, is common knowledge to in-
vestors, and is distinctly independent of investor sentiment. Thus, 
investor demand manifests only in the aftermarket.
Second, if the average IPO is initially overpriced, then one cannot 
know whether long-run negative returns are due to investor overre-
action or simply result from the initial overpricing. The second ad-
vantage of our sample of thrifts is that underpricing is known ex 
ante to many market participants. Thus, any negative excess returns 
can be attributed to investor overreaction sometime after the IPO. 
The empirical tests in the paper are based upon this simple insight.
2. Thrift conversion process
2.1. Regulatory process for thrift conversions   
The thrift industry is comprised of both stock and mutual 
forms of ownership. Mutual organizations are owned by depos-
itors whereas stock thrifts are owned by shareholders. Until the 
early 1980s, the thrift industry was dominated by mutual own-
ership. For example, Esty (1997) reports that in 1979 stock thrifts 
held only 25% of thrift industry assets. Chaddad and Cook (2004) 
note that deregulation and macroeconomic forces, such as in-
creased interest rate volatility during the 1980s, changed the com-
petitive environment in which thrifts operate. Mutual thrifts were 
most vulnerable to these industry shocks since mutual thrifts rely 
on retained earnings as their only source of capital.
Prior to 1982, stock ownership for a federally chartered thrift 
was not an ownership structure option. In response to a large 
number of failed thrifts, laws were changed authorizing stock 
ownership and mutual-to-stock conversions. To promote stock 
ownership, Congress passed the Garn-St Germain Depository Act 
of 1982, which legalized stock ownership and mutual-to-stock 
conversions for federally chartered thrifts. These changes were 
successful in attracting mutual thrifts to convert to stock owner-
ship; Chaddad and Cook (2004) report that stock thrifts currently 
hold approximately 90% of industry assets.
The primary regulator of thrift institutions is the Office of Thrift 
Supervision. The current “sale-of-stock” conversion process was 
adopted by the predecessor to the Office of Thrift Supervision, the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), in 1974.6 This process 
provides for the sale-of-stock of the converting thrift at a price 
equal to its pro forma market value as determined by an indepen-
dent appraisal. The sale-of-stock approach was selected since the 
FHLBB viewed it as the most viable way of minimizing windfall 
distributions to accountholders (Smith and Underwood, 1997).
A mutual-to-stock conversion begins with the thrift’s board of 
directors drafting and adopting a plan of conversion. The plan of 
conversion must include subscription priorities, limits on maxi-
mum purchases (generally 5%), provision for the liquidation ac-
count and pro forma market valuation of the institution, and ad-
ditional limits on stock purchases by officers and directors. Once 
the board approves the conversion plan, the thrift prepares to file 
its application for approval (Form AC). Form AC consists of the 
conversion plan, an independent appraisal establishing market 
value of the thrift, and the proxy statement. The proxy statement 
includes the thrift’s current financial statements.
The independent appraisal is prepared with respect to regula-
tory guidelines. An independent appraiser, hired by management, 
establishes the market value for the converting thrift immediately 
following conversion by comparing the converting thrift with 
a sample of similar publicly traded thrifts while considering the 
thrift’s intended use of the proceeds.7 A minimum and maximum 
range for the firm’s value is computed and reported as 15% above 
and below the estimated value after conversion. Management se-
lects the offer size from within this range (Unal, 1997) and thus 
has some control over the degree of underpricing. This is consis-
tent with the results of Maksimovic and Unal (1993), who find ev-
idence that issue size and underpricing are directly related, and 
Cagle and Porter (1997) who state that management may be likely 
to underprice thrift conversion IPOs. However, the choice of issue 
size will not introduce overpricing even if management chooses 
an issue size 15% above the appraised value, since pre-conversion 
equity is always transferred to IPO investors at no cost.
Following the submission of a complete application, regula-
tory authorities review the Form AC and give comments on the 
adequacy of the appraisal, the legal sufficiency of the plan and 
disclosures, and the accuracy of the accounting. Once the appli-
cation for conversion is approved, the thrift immediately distrib-
utes its proxy statement to members. After a period of 20–45 days, 
the thrift can hold its special meeting of account holders. The plan 
must be approved by a majority of the outstanding votes of mem-
bers unless state law requires a higher percentage for state char-
tered institutions. As previously stated, the stock offering follows 
the sale-of-stock approach. The sale-of-stock approach gives de-
positors and managers the first opportunity to purchase shares 
6 The current sale-of-stock approach was preceded by the free-distribution-of-stock approach that was in force from 1961 to 1963 (Unal, 1997). The 
free-distribution-of-stock approach required that the converting thrift’s pre-conversion equity be distributed on a pro rata basis to existing de-
positors. As noted by Unal (1997), this approach caused numerous problems and was criticized on the grounds that it would result in a wind-
fall to depositors. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board responded by placing a moratorium on free-distribution-of-stock conversions in 1963 fol-
lowed by a Congressional statutory moratorium on conversions in April 1973 (Unal, 1997).
7 As noted in Pettigrew et al. (1999), some regulatory authorities have expressed concerns that the appraisal value has frequently been set to low. 
If true, this will serve to increase the degree of underpricing, and therefore not affect the validity of using abnormal returns to make inferences 
about post-IPO investor behavior.
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(Unal, 1997). If the conversion offering is not oversubscribed, then 
subscription rights go to members of the thrift who were not eligi-
ble depositors or shares are sold to the public.
The FHLBB adopted amendments in 1979 to limit management 
purchases, which had averaged 34% of the total stock sold (Smith 
and Underwood, 1997). Management purchases were limited to 25–
35% (depending on size of the thrift) in the aggregate and managers 
were restricted from selling any shares purchased in the initial sub-
scription for a period of 1 year (Wilcox, 2006).8 These amendments 
also limited maximum purchases from any person to 5% (Smith and 
Underwood, 1997). The subscription rights are nontransferable and 
can only be exercised by the recipient. Regulations prohibit anyone 
directly or indirectly from acquiring ownership of more than ten 
percent of the conversion stock without board approval.
2.2. The nature of built-in underpricing
A key feature that differentiates a thrift conversion from the 
typical IPO is that at the time of conversion, the depositors are 
stripped of their claim on pre-conversion equity and the claim 
is automatically transferred to the new shareholders. Since, the 
net proceeds of the IPO simply become an asset of the converted 
thrift, IPO investors have a claim to both pre-conversion market 
value and all proceeds from the stock sale. In other words, the IPO 
investors have a claim on total pre-conversion market value at no 
cost to them. To formalize, suppose an economically solvent mu-
tual thrift applies for conversion to stock ownership. Utilizing the 
model developed by Maksimovic and Unal (1993, p. 1664), let V0 
represent the value of pre-conversion equity and let GV0 measure 
the present value of pre-conversion growth opportunities. The 
pre-conversion market value of the thrift is given by:
VP = V0 + GV0
Wilcox and Williams (1998) show that solvency implies that 
VP is positive.9 In addition to the IPO proceeds, denoted VIPO, the 
class of investors purchasing the newly issued shares also receives 
100% ownership of the pre-conversion market value at no cost. 
The fundamental value of the thrift after conversion equals
VT = VP + VIPO – K                              (1)
where K denotes issuance costs. In an efficient market, the post-
conversion market value will equal the fundamental value, de-
fined in Equation (1), and the first-day price change will equal the 
fundamental value minus the issue price VIPO.
Let Pday1 denote the market value at the end of the first day of 
trading. If investors are rational, first day trading will drive the 
market price from the issue price, VIPO, to fundamental value VT, 
so that Pday1 = VT. Underreaction may produce a positive return 
that results in a first day closing price Pday1 < VT, while overreac-
tion will result in Pday1 > VT. Thus, the presence of a positive first 
day return by no means indicates investor overreaction, though it 
may provide an incentive for momentum trading in the new issue.
Equation (1) illustrates the underpricing built into thrift con-
versions. Thrift IPO investors pay VIPO and receive assets worth 
VT = VP + VIPO − K. Thus, in addition to a claim on the IPO pro-
ceeds themselves, IPO investors also receive a claim on the full 
pre-conversion market value. As a result, the initial underpric-
ing is equal to the pre-conversion value of the firm VP – K. This 
term is almost certain to be positive for an economically solvent 
thrift that converts to stock using the sale-of-stock method (Ma-
sulis, 1987; Barth et al., 1994; Unal, 1997). In other words, if the 
pre-conversion thrift is solvent, underpricing is unavoidable. For this 
reason, Maksimovic and Unal (1993) note that, unlike the typical 
IPO, a thrift conversion may experience subsequent price appre-
ciation even without informational asymmetries. Wilcox and Wil-
liams (1998) find that size of excess first-day returns is highly pre-
dictable using pre-conversion firm value.10
The near certainty of excess returns to participants of thrift con-
versions has not escaped regulatory attention. As discussed in 
Colantuoni (1998), the Office of Thrift Supervision (1994) guide-
lines seek to eliminate windfall gains on IPOs by setting the ex-
pected post-conversion stock price equal to the IPO price, that is, 
VT = VIPO. Of course, this is impossible except under the following 
restrictive conditions: (a) the pre-conversion market value of the 
firm is zero; or (b) IPO proceeds are invested in negative NPV proj-
ects; or (c) the conversion and issuance fees exceed the pre-conver-
sion market value.11 Otherwise, VT > VIPO, the post-issue market 
value exceeds the IPO price, VIPO, and the issue is underpriced.
Some behavioral theories predict that in environments with large 
single-day returns, investors may be prone to overreaction which 
drives prices above fundamental value.12 Daniel et al. (1998) predict 
initial investor overreaction, followed by additional subsequent over-
reaction and then mean-reversion. In our setting, their model predicts 
large, positive first-day returns, positive abnormal returns for a pe-
riod after the issue, and negative abnormal returns during the mean-
reversion period. In addition, initial overreaction will lead to nega-
tive long-run returns relative to the first-day closing price.
In contrast, the models of Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and 
Stein (1999) predict initial investor underreaction, followed by 
subsequent overreaction and later reversion to fundamental value. 
Like the Daniel et al. (1998) model, these theories predict positive 
first-day returns, positive abnormal returns for a period after the 
issue, and negative abnormal returns during the mean-reversion 
period. However, because investors initially underreact to infor-
mation, all long-run returns will be positive when measured rela-
tive to the first-day closing price. Excess negative returns will exist 
only during the later, post-issue sub-periods. Lastly, if investors 
never overreact to information, one will observe positive or zero 
abnormal returns over all post-issue sub-periods. The next section 
examines post-IPO returns in detail.
3. Data and methodology
Figure 1 presents four different scenarios of investor reaction at 
the IPO and in the aftermarket. The four scenarios depict initial in-
8 Cole and Mehran (1998) find that after the expiration of this lock-up period, managers of the average firm subsequently increased their owner-
ship percentages.
9 A distinction must be made between the book value and market value of pre-conversion equity, both of which are relevant in the context of the 
converting firm. Regulatory decisions, including decisions to close or rehabilitate a thrift, are based upon book values, whereas for shareholders 
the relevant measure of value is the firm’s market value. This distinction ultimately blurs prior to the conversion, since the market value of firm 
equity is unobservable. Kane and Unal (1990) present a model for market-value/book-value relationships for financial institutions. The pre-con-
version market value can be viewed as the sum of the market value of both unbooked equity and booked equity. If book value is assumed to be 
an unbiased estimate of market value, booked equity is the pre-conversion net worth of the converting thrift, and thus an appropriate estimate 
of pre-conversion market value.
10 Both Wilcox and Williams (1998) and Colantuoni (1998), utilizing public information available at the time of conversion, present evidence illus-
trating the predictive nature of excess first-day returns. The explanatory variable used by Wilcox and Williams (1998) is the ratio of pre-conver-
sion equity (book value) to appraised value while Colantuoni (1998) uses the ratio pre-conversion equity (book value) to total assets. The results 
reported by both show that pre-conversion equity (book value) is highly significant in explaining initial returns.
11 See Maksimovic and Unal (1993), Unal (1997), Colantuoni (1998), and Wilcox and Williams (1998) for detailed treatments of this issue.
12 Bali et al. (2008) find that the larger an extreme return, the greater the speed of mean-reversion to fundamental value.
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vestor under- or overreaction to an IPO and eventual reversion of 
price to fundamental value. Scenario 1 displays initial underreac-
tion followed by slow convergence to fundamental value with no 
overreaction. Scenario 2 also depicts initial underreaction, followed 
by subsequent overreaction and eventual convergence to funda-
mental value. Scenario 2 is consistent with the Barberis et al. (1998) 
and Hong and Stein (1999) models. Scenario 3 displays initial inves-
tor overreaction, followed by subsequent mean-reversion to funda-
mental value. Scenario 4 displays initial overreaction, followed by 
additional subsequent overreaction, and eventual convergence to 
fundamental value. Scenario 4 is consistent with Daniel et al. (1998).
Our first task is to establish that the average thrift in our sam-
ple is not overpriced at the issue, which implies that any negative 
excess returns during the post-IPO period must reflect investor 
overreaction at some point after the IPO.
3.1. Sample construction and summary statistics
We utilize a sample of thrift institutions that converted from mu-
tual to stock ownership during the period between 1993 and 2000. 
We begin with 1993 since Barth et al. (1994) state that between 1980 
and 1990, many thrifts were poorly capitalized following conversion 
and were eventually seized by regulators. In addition to poor cap-
italization, the converted thrifts pursued excessive growth strate-
gies or paid excessive dividends or salaries. Thrifts that converted in 
the 1990s were better capitalized. Our sample ends in 2000, because 
some of our empirical tests require 5 years of post-IPO return data.
To construct a survivor-bias free sample set of converting 
thrifts to measure risk-adjusted performance, our sample be-
gins with a listing of 351 firms that filed applications for conver-
sion with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board during 1993–2000.13 
From this list, we eliminate all non-publicly traded firms, leaving 
a sample of 221 firms. The split-adjusted offer price was provided 
by SNL Securities. Daily returns for the 5 years following conver-
sion are determined using the CRSP NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ 
files. In addition, the Fama and French factors were obtained from 
Ken French’s website.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the sample of convert-
ing firms. Similar to the results in Pettigrew et al. (1999) and Wil-
cox and Williams (1998), we document an average first-day return 
of approximately18% for the thrifts in our sample. The cumulative 
return for days 2–5 is not significantly different from zero. Thus, 
the momentum from the initial day of trading does not appear to 
carry over into returns on the next 4 days.
Initial underpricing requires a positive pre-conversion mar-
ket value. We assume that the average thrift has positive pre-con-
version market value, but because our sample firms do not trade 
prior to the IPO, we cannot observe the initial market value VP. 
However, there are several reasons to believe that this assumption 
is reasonable. First, both Wilcox and Williams (1998) and Colantu-
oni (1998) present evidence of a strong correlation between initial 
excess returns and pre-conversion book value. Moreover, as Unal 
(1997) notes, it would be difficult to rationalize an investment in 
an ex ante overpriced firm, since the rational consequence of such 
overpricing is an immediate loss of investor capital from the neg-
ative initial return.14 Consistent with average initial underpricing, 
214 of our 221 firms have positive initial returns.
We also examine pre-conversion tangible book value. Table 1 
reports statistics on IPO proceeds, and pre-conversion tangible 
book value of equity (pro forma book tangible value minus IPO 
proceeds). The average IPO raises approximately $55 million, with 
13 We thank SNL Securities for the list of firms.
14 Such overpayment might be rational if investors viewed the firm as a gamble, where overpayment is simply the price of admission to the casino.
Figure 1. Hypothetical initial investor reaction and subsequent price response to an IPO. The graph presents four different scenarios of initial in-
vestor reaction and subsequent price response to an IPO. Without loss of generality, the issue is assumed to be underpriced by 15%, so the hori-
zontal line at 15% represents the cumulative excess return associated with convergence of the firm value to fundamental value. Scenario 1 displays 
initial underreaction and subsequent convergence to fundamental value (no overreaction). Scenario 2 presents initial underreaction, followed by 
subsequent overreaction and eventual convergence to fundamental value. Scenario 2 is consistent with Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein 
(1999). Scenario 3 depicts initial overreaction and subsequent mean-reversion to fundamental value. Scenario 4 also displays initial overreaction, 
followed by subsequent overreaction, and eventual convergence to fundamental value. Scenario 4 is consistent with Daniel et al. (1998).
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a pre-conversion tangible book value of $21 million; the median 
IPO raises just under $24 million, and has a pre-conversion tan-
gible book value of approximately $9 million. On average, the ra-
tio of pre-conversion book value to IPO proceeds is 45% (median 
value 40%). All but one of the 221 firms in our sample had positive 
tangible book value, again supporting the assumption that the av-
erage firm is underpriced at conversion. Thus, while we cannot 
explicitly measure the firms’ pre-IPO market values, these results 
support the assumption that the average firm in our sample is un-
derpriced.15 Even if pre-conversion equity is positive, it is possible 
that fees associated with the IPO will exceed the value of pre-con-
version equity, thus eliminating initial underpricing. This is un-
likely to be the case with our sample. Chen and Ritter (2000) doc-
ument that during the period 1995–1998 over 95% of IPOs raising 
between $20 and $80 million incurred investment banking com-
missions (fees) of 7% or less. Since the average pre-conversion eq-
uity in our sample is 45% of the IPO proceeds, the magnitude of 
IPO fees is too small to drive pre-conversion equity below zero 
and eliminate initial underpricing.16
The remaining results in Table 1 indicate that the average firm 
has a closing bid-ask spread of $0.43, declining from a high of 
$0.67 in 1993 to $0.27 in 2000. Firm assets average $648 million, 
the average price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio is 18.4, and the average 
price-to-book (P/B) ratio is 0.973. The average thrift has a post-
conversion market capitalization of $72.899 million, and an aver-
age daily trading volume of 112,600 shares.
3.2. Benchmark definition and construction of control groups
We analyze long-run excess performance on both an absolute 
and risk-adjusted basis. Absolute excess performance is measured 
by calculating buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARS). Ritter 
and Welch (2002) argue that when IPOs are measured against like 
size firms the long-run performance of IPOs is close to zero. We 
therefore measure BHARS relative to four benchmarks: the CRSP 
value-weighted index, SNL Thrift Index, and two control groups 
of size-matched thrifts. The SNL Thrift Index is a non-traded equal 
weighted index that tracks the total return of the seasoned thrift 
industry.17 The control groups are calculated as follows: For each 
converting thrift in our sample, we find the firm in the same in-
dustry with the closest market value in the year of conversion. To 
select the sample of matched firms, we first download all thrifts 
in Compustat for the period 1993–2000. We use four-digit stan-
dard industry classification codes (SIC) of the converting thrifts 
to identify all firms in the thrift industry. From this sample, we 
eliminate all firms that are part of our sample of converting thrifts. 
The market values for all remaining firms are computed on De-
cember 31 for each sample year, then sorted by year to facilitate 
matching year of conversion and market value. These firms repre-
sent our control group candidates. Due to the regulated environ-
ment and the unique financial position of thrifts, we match only 
on industry and market capitalization. This parallels the practice 
used in the thrift appraisal process, where size and industry are 
two key criteria used to identify comparable firms. The control 
group candidate with the market value closest to the sample firm 
is selected. Every candidate firm chosen is eliminated to avoid any 
reuse of control group candidates. In order to exclude initial day 
returns, the matching firm’s IPO date must precede the convert-
ing thrift’s IPO date.18 We construct two control group samples, 
with the main difference being the length of time the control firms 
must exist prior to the converting thrift’s IPO. The two groups are 
constructed to balance two offsetting features of the data. On the 
15 Of the 7 firms with negative returns, 5 have returns that are less than 5% in absolute value, and the firm with the lowest first day return faced 
subsequent lawsuits alleging that the firm misrepresented its financial condition prior to the IPO. We keep all 221 firms in our sample, but ver-
ify that all of our results are qualitatively robust to excluding the seven firms with negative first-day returns. The largest negative return is as-
sociated with Carver Bancorp, which converted on October 25, 1994. The stock was offered at $10 per share, and closed the first day of trading 
at $7.66 (split adjusted), for a negative 23.44% return. Carver experienced financial difficulties prior to and after the conversion and the negative 
first-day return most likely reflects a negative value of equity in place prior to the conversion. However, investors may not have been able to ac-
curately assess the value of pre-conversion equity: Subsequent to its conversion Carver faced litigation alleging that the offering circular con-
tained material omissions and misstatements, and settled a lawsuit in August 1998 related to these misstatements. While this is an isolated and 
extreme event, we retain it as part of our sample to fully capture the cross-section of post-conversion thrift performance.
16 We also hand collect data on IPO expenses for the first 15 thrifts (sorted alphabetically) in our sample to measure the magnitude of IPO fees. The 
average IPO fee as a percentage of total IPO proceeds was 3.53% with a maximum of 6.61% and a minimum of 2.35%. IPO expenses for our sam-
ple of thrifts appear to be consistent with the results of Chen and Ritter (2000).
17 We thank SNL Securities for providing daily values for their Thrift Index.
18 Not all thrift IPOs result from mutual-to-stock conversion. Closely held thrifts and mutual holding companies can also convert to publicly 
traded thrifts. Neither of these types of IPO are included in our primary sample of converting thrifts, but are included in the list of candidate 
firms for the control sample.
Table 1. Yearly sample statistics on converting thrifts. Average firm characteristics are reported for each year in the sample. The initial return is defined as the closing price on the first day 
of trade, minus the offer price, divided by the offer price. Offer prices are provided by SNL Securities and hand verified in the Wall Street Journal. Cumulative return for days two through 
five is defined as the closing price on the fifth day of trading, minus the closing price on the first day of trading, divided by the closing price on the first day of trading. Number of conversions, 
IPO Proceeds and pre-conversion equity data are provided by SNL Securities, and the ratio of pre-conversion equity to IPO Proceeds is reported as pre-conversion equity to proceeds ratio. 
COMPUSTAT data are used to calculate post-conversion assets (data6), post-conversion Price-to-Earnings (P/E) ratio and Price-to-Book (P/B) ratio. P/E price of equity to earnings, and P/B is 
market value of total assets to book value of total assets. P/E is calculated as mkt_equity/(data53*data54) and P/B is calculated as [(data181 − data35 + prefstk + mkt_equity)/(data6)], where 
mkt_equity equals (data199*data25), and prefstk equals data10, or data56 if data10 is missing, or data130 if data56 and data10 are missing. Post-conversion market capitalization, average 
daily trading volume and average bid-ask spread are calculated for each firm using daily CRSP data for all trading days in the calendar year of conversion.
Year            #     First-day       Cum. return       IPO                      Pre-conversion    Pre-con equity       Bid-ask       Assets              P/E         P/B          Post-conversion      Avg. daily 	
                               return (%)     days 2–5 (%)    proceed  (000s)    equity (000s)       to proceeds (%)     spread                                ratio        ratio         market cap              volume                                    
Panel (a): Sample of converting thrifts
1993 22 26.76 1.42 73,396 22,312.3 60.16 0.666 735,222 11.8 0.970 66,174.8 83,565.5
1994 46 12.84 −0.02 66,342 31,759.0 50.98 0.472 653,518 16.6 0.957 78,554.5 77,439.3
1995 51 15.45 0.51 28,338 11,364.8 47.51 0.470 292,201 15.6 0.981 36,345.2 164,885.5
1996 48 12.54 0.44 34,848 12,702.8 39.12 0.445 629,204 22.8 1.007 43,295.9 46,420.5
1997 19 34.81 0.75 81,121 23,636.6 35.77 0.300 1,414,610 22.1 1.061 140,564.4 219,531.0
1998 20 31.33 −0.56 100,321 18,860.1 27.81 0.281 877,647 18.5 0.971 154,847.9 118,477.2
1999 9 6.85 −2.38 83,445 48,268.4 54.80 0.134 702,202 20.6 0.936 99,040.3 229,681.4
2000 6 6.41 −1.04 47,445 38,510.0 74.94 0.270 692,269 12.1 0.964 75,104.6 39,786.6
Mean 221 17.91 0.24 54,830 20,963.3 45.06 0.434 648,405 18.4 0.973 72,899.7 112,599.5
Median 221 17.18 0.00 23,804 9,242 40.35 0.362 308,219 15.1 0.971 29,645.5 25,987.8
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one hand, since we are trying to isolate the market dynamics of 
the converting thrifts shortly after their IPOs, we wish to elimi-
nate all newly-public firms from the control group, so that they 
are not also experiencing post-IPO dynamics. On the other hand, 
the thrift industry witnessed considerable consolidation during 
the sample period. Of our primary sample of 221 firms, only 108 
remain at the end of 5 years, with the majority of the disappear-
ing firms acquired by larger banks or thrifts at a sizable acquisi-
tion premium. Imposing the requirement that all control thrifts be 
“well-seasoned” implicitly eliminates many firms from the con-
trol group that were themselves acquired at a premium, which re-
duces the average return for the control group.
In constructing the first control group, we do not impose a 
waiting period from IPO date to be considered a match firm (we 
do require that the control firm is publicly traded at the time of the 
converting thrift’s IPO). This construction methodology is similar 
to the methodology used by SNL Securities to construct the SNL 
Thrift Index. The second control group imposes the requirement 
that the matched control firm has been traded publicly for at least 
3 years prior to the converting thrift’s IPO date, which closely fol-
lows Ritter (1991).
Our sample of converting thrifts experienced numerous del-
istments over the 5 year holding period. Accordingly, it is impor-
tant that we avoid survivorship bias with respect to our control 
group. To avoid survivorship bias, we follow Ritter (1991) and se-
lect matching firms regardless of when they delist. As a result, our 
control group experiences delistments during the 5 year holding 
period similar to our sample of converting thrifts (reported in Ta-
ble 3 below).
Table 2 reports sample statistics on firm characteristics for the 
SNL Thrift Index and the two control groups. The average market 
capitalization for firms in the SNL Index is $218 million. This is 
substantially larger than the average size of the converting thrifts, 
and is driven by the presence of several very large thrifts in the In-
dex, including Washington Mutual, which had a market capital-
ization of $29 billion in 2000. The median market cap for firms in 
the SNL Index is $47 million. The average (median) market capi-
talization for control groups one and two are much closer to the 
sample of converting thrifts at $75 million ($33 million) and $135 
million ($41 million), respectively.
Average trading volume in the year of conversion is higher for 
the converting thrifts than either of the control groups or the SNL 
Index. Bid-ask spread data is not available for the SNL Index, but 
the two control groups exhibit the same relative decline in spreads 
over the sample period, though the absolute level of the spread for 
the control groups is about twice the spread for the sample of con-
verting thrifts. Converting thrifts have an average (median) price-
to-earnings ratio of 18.4 (15.1) compared to 14.1 (12.9) for the SNL 
Index, 14.1 (12.4) for control group 1 and 13.0 (11.5) for control 
group 2. Both the mean and median price-to-book ratio for con-
verting thrifts is 0.97, compared to an average of 1.55 for the SNL 
Index and 1.02 for both control groups.
3.3. Long-run thrift returns
The most appropriate benchmark is rarely obvious in an event 
study. However, our entire sample comes from the homogeneous 
thrift industry, and returns for this industry diverged quite sub-
stantially from the value-weighted CRSP index over the sample 
period (Figure 2).19 This suggests that BHARS relative to a broad 
market index may present a distorted view of true long-run thrift 
performance. While we calculate and report statistics relative to 
the market, the analysis and discussion below focuses on mea-
sures of excess performance relative to the SNL Thrift index and 
thrift control groups.
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARS) are calculated ac-
cording to
(2)
where γit = return on the stock i on day t; T = offer date + number 
trading days in sample sub-period, or delisting date, if sooner; and 
γmt = benchmark return day t. To exclude positive initial returns, 
we follow Carter et al. (1998) and exclude the first five trading 
days from all long-run calculations. Excess long-run performance 
is measured for up to 5 years following the date of conversion.20 A 
converted thrift is included for the lesser of the 5 years following 
conversion or the delisting date of the thrift.
Table 3 reports cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal returns. To 
guard against survivorship bias, we first report buy-and-hold ex-
cess returns for all sample firms in Panel (a), calculated accord-
ing to Equation (2). Thus, BHARS for all holding periods are cal-
culated for all 221 firms. If a firm delists prior to the end of the 
holding period, that firm’s BHAR is calculated through the delist-
ing date and is included in all subsequent time periods. Several in-
teresting observations emerge from Panel (a). First, mean and me-
dian cumulative abnormal returns are either zero or positive over 
the first 12 months. Thus, in addition to the large first-day return 
(excluded from all calculations in Table 3), converting thrifts per-
form somewhat better than other thrifts in the first year after the 
IPO.
Second, long-run performance becomes negative in year two 
and remains negative for up to 5 years, regardless of the thrift 
benchmark utilized. For example, relative to the SNL Index the 
average cumulative return through the end of year two is −13.41% 
(median −17.14%). The corresponding average abnormal returns 
are −12.28% and −9.90% for control groups 1 and 2, respectively. 
All of these differences are statistically and economically signifi-
cant. Cumulative abnormal returns continue to decline through 
month 30 before stabilizing through the end of the 5-year sample 
period. We also report median returns in Table 3. The results indi-
cate the median firm underperformed the average thrift with re-
spect to cumulative long-run performance over the 5-year hold-
ing period. This result is not unexpected given the thrift industry 
is characterized by many small firms that are overcapitalized with 
relatively low margins (American Banker, 2004).
Our sample of converting thrifts decreases by 113 firms over 
the 60 month holding period. The majority of these firms disap-
pear because they are acquired. Panel (a) returns include the del-
ist return associated with the acquisition. In Panel (b), we report 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns only for those firms that survive 
to the end of each holding period, which eliminates all firms ac-
quired during the sample period. Once again, the converted 
thrifts underperform all benchmarks over the 5 year holding pe-
riod. The magnitude of underperformance relative to the SNL in-
dex is larger in Panel (b) than reported in Panel (a). This is sim-
ply because the average returns on acquired thrifts (including the 
takeover premium) are larger than the average returns on non-ac-
quired thrifts during our sample period. Panel (c) reports survi-
vorship data for the converting thrifts and both control groups. 
Consistent with the objectives of using a control group methodol-
19 Regressing returns for the SNL Thrift Index on the value-weighted CRSP index results in a market beta that is not significantly different from 
zero. The returns for the SNL Thrift Index closely mirror the returns of other thrift indexes. For example, data on the American Banker Thrift In-
dex are available from 1997 through 2005, and over this period the American Banker Thrift Index earned cumulative returns of 303% vs. 311% 
for the SNL Index.
20 We do not control for differences in analyst coverage, since Bradley et al. (2008) find that neither analysts’ research coverage nor all-star analyst 
coverage affect the long-run performance of IPOs.
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ogy, both control groups experience levels of firm attrition similar 
to the converting thrifts. As a result, the abnormal returns relative 
to the control groups are qualitatively similar between Panels (a) 
and (b), particularly for control group one.
Figure 2. SNL Thrift Index and Value–Weighted Market Index. Figure plots daily closing values for SNL Thrift Index and CRSP value-weighted 
market index from January 1, 1993 to July 31, 2005, each normalized to a starting value of 100.
Table 2. Yearly Sample Statistics on SNL Thrift Index and Control Thrifts. Average firm characteristics are reported for each year in the sample. Data in Panel (a) are provided by SNL 
Securities, and report average summary statistics for seasoned thrifts that comprise the SNL Thrift Index. For each calendar year, we report the average value for each statistic, and also report 
average and median values for the entire sample period. Panels (b) and (c) report summary statistics for the two control groups described in the text. Post-conversion market capitalization, 
average daily trading volume and average bid-ask spread are calculated for each firm using daily CRSP data for all trading days in each calendar year. Assets, P/E ratio and P/B ratio are 
calculated as described in Table 1.
Year	 N Post-conversion market cap Avg. daily volume Bid-ask spread Assets P/E ratio P/B ratio
Panel (a): SNL thrift index
1993 504 107,490.1 22,047.0 n/a 1,113,340 11.4 1.16
1994 474 105,078.3 29,188.5 n/a 1,225,963 12.0 1.12
1995 442 152,836.8 31,050.3 n/a 1,430,204 13.2 1.17
1996 421 202,813.3 33,275.4 n/a 1,640,729 14.3 1.32
1997 382 311,316.5 42,820.3 n/a 1,726,479 16.9 2.02
1998 337 282,548.0 58,721.1 n/a 1,915,591 17.9 2.17
1999 309 224,669.1 60,683.0 n/a 2,173,410 15.5 1.85
2000 293 357,381.7 57,567.7 n/a 2,549,171 11.3 1.58
Avg. 3162 218,016.7 39,348.0 n/a 1,721,860 14.1 1.55
Median 3162 47,110.0 36,191.1 n/a 366,648 12.9 1.35
Panel (b): Control Group 1
1993 22 64,081.4 8,278.9 1.043 774,603 8.95 1.01
1994 46 82,383.6 27,269.6 0.859 1,173,580 11.50 0.99
1995 51 38,400.4 7,058.3 1.127 429,455 12.77 1.01
1996 48 47,342.3 9,838.0 0.712 464,575 28.53 1.03
1997 19 133,215.6 14,049.4 0.836 765,773 17.18 1.08
1998 20 161,022.6 35,535.1 0.601 1,162,530 13.63 1.03
1999 9 100,665.8 17,383.0 0.248 881,635 13.46 1.01
2000 6 91,772.0 14,086.3 0.212 759,772 18.50 0.99
Avg. 221 75,287.1 15,779.8 0.840 748,134 14.12 1.02
Median 221 33,360.4 3,547.1 0.631 331,852 12.42 1.01
Panel (c): Control Group 2
1993 22 123,082.1 20,097.6 1.112 1,493,120 8.78 1.01
1994 46 42,349.8 16,570.1 0.832 691,810 8.02 1.00
1995 51 74,433.1 13,032.3 0.707 862,209 10.33 1.01
1996 48 81,537.0 11,434.4 0.987 854,255 18.70 1.03
1997 19 154.826.1 10,357.8 0.920 766,062 22.88 1.08
1998 20 686,327.6 76,283.4 0.604 4,792,020 15.54 1.04
1999 9 61,664.6 10,108.1 0.486 644,392 11.56 0.99
2000 6 34,650.5 18,178.5 0.483 921,898 12.10 0.96
Avg. 221 134,736.7 19,681.9 0.827 1,186,630 13.03 1.02
Median 221 40,536.2 3,841.2 0.631 371,364 11.46 1.01
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The negative long-run returns from Table 3 suggests that in-
vestor behavior on the initial day and subsequent 12 months of 
trading causes prices to rise above fundamental value. To iden-
tify specific sub-periods of under and overperformance during the 
5-year holding period, we calculate buy-and-hold excess returns 
for 6-month interim periods after the IPO. The results, presented 
Table 3. Post-IPO long-run returns of converting thrifts. All reported returns exclude the first five trading days after the IPO. Buy-and-hold returns are first calculated for each firm at each 
horizon, and cross-sectional means or medians are then reported. The left section of the table reports mean buy-and-hold returns for converted thrifts and mean abnormal returns relative to 
the CRSP value-weighed index. The middle section reports mean and median buy-and-hold abnormal returns relative to the SNL Thrift Index for the sample of converted thrifts and for the two 
control groups described in the text. The right section reports the mean and median abnormal returns for the sample of converted thrifts relative to each of the control groups. Panel (a) calculates 
BHARs for every holding period for all 221 firms in the original sample. If a firm disappears prior to the end of a holding period, its return through the date of disappearance is used. Panel (b) 
calculates BHARs for each holding period conditional upon a firm surviving to the end of the holding period. Panel (c) reports the number of firms surviving to the end of each holding period. 
T-statistics are in parentheses for means and differences in means; for individual medians, parentheses contain p-values from a Sign test for difference from zero; for differences in medians, 
parentheses contain two-sided p-values from a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in medians.
                                                                          BHARS (vs. SNL Index)                                                                                        IPO BHAR minus Control BHAR
N           Holding        IPO              IPO              IPO              IPO               Control 1      Control 1       Control 2      Control 2       IPO minus     IPO minus    IPO minus    IPO minus
              period          BHAR          minus           minus           minus            minus SNL   minus SNL    minus SNL   minus SNL   Control 1       Control 1      Control 2      Control 2
              thru              (mean)         market         SNL             SNL                (mean)         (median)      (mean)         (median)       (mean)           (median)      (mean)         (median)
              month            (%)             (mean)         (mean)        (median)          (%)              (%)               (%)                  (%)               (%)                 (%)              (%)               (%)
                                                       (%)               (%)               (%)   
Panel (a): All sample firms
221 6 13.31 5.28 1.15 −1.14 −4.07 −3.95 −2.12 −2.71 5.22 2.81 3.27 1.57
   (4.80) (1.23) (0.224)     (2.67) (0.003) (1.93) (0.107)
221 12 29.51 10.14 1.51 −0.58 −2.45 −6.49 −3.53 −5.62 3.96 5.91 5.04 5.04
   (5.60) (1.17) (0.419)     (1.13) (0.005) (1.81) (0.057)
221 18 42.84 10.87 −5.17 −8.71 −0.54 −4.50 −4.41 −8.86 −4.63 −4.21 −0.76 0.15
   (4.38) (−2.55) (<0.001)     (−0.97) (0.354) (−0.21) (0.768)
221 24 52.00 6.07 −13.41 −17.14 −1.14 −4.78 −3.51 −6.68 −12.28 −12.36 −9.90 −10.46
   (1.83) (−4.97) (<0.001)     (−2.12) (0.016) (−2.27) (0.015)
221 30 61.73 5.35 −17.38 −18.21 −1.15 −10.74 −2.36 −5.59 −16.23 −7.47 −15.02 −12.62
   (1.28) (−5.33) (<0.001)     (−2.43) (0.001) (−3.00) (<0.001)
221 36 77.21 8.94 −16.78 −21.76 −3.47 −10.23 −1.27 −4.59 −13.31 −11.53 −15.51 −17.17
   (1.75) (−4.06) (<0.001)     (−1.85) (0.047) (−2.60) (0.001)
221 42 89.46 11.19 −13.48 −21.53 −2.11 −10.23 0.98 −4.71 −11.37 −11.30 −14.46 −16.82
   (1.93) (−3.02) (<0.001)     (−1.40) (0.082) (−2.14) (0.005)
221 48 96.28 9.83 −14.09 −22.70 −2.21 −5.87 −1.35 −7.00 −11.88 −16.83 −12.74 −15.70
   (1.44) (−2.79) (<0.001)     (−1.32) (0.035) (−1.63) (0.019)
221 54 105.08 14.61 −13.52 −22.77 −5.61 −6.72 −0.64 −2.57 −7.91 −16.05 −12.88 −20.20
   (1.84) (−2.17) (<0.001)     (−0.81) (0.109) (−1.42) (0.016)
221 60 106.38 13.70 −14.00 −22.77 −4.08 −4.65 0.59 −2.91 −9.92 −18.12 −14.59 −19.86
   (1.50) (−1.85) (<0.001)     (−0.93) (0.038) (−1.43) (0.006)
Panel (b): Firms surviving to end of sample period
221 6 13.31 5.28 1.15 −1.14 −4.01 −3.98 −2.13 −2.82 5.16 2.84 3.28 1.68
   (4.80) (1.23) (0.226)     2.62 (0.002) (1.92) (0.107)
221 12 29.51 10.14 1.51 −0.59 −2.81 −7.37 −3.96 −6.25 4.32 6.78 5.47 5.67
   (5.60) (1.17) (0.419)     −0.63 (0.005) (1.95) (0.024)
219 18 42.50 10.53 −5.79 −8.77 −2.60 −6.40 −6.72 −11.57 −3.19 −2.37 0.93 2.80
   (4.22) (−2.91) (<0.001)     (−1.11) (0.659) (0.28) (0.804)
207 24 49.69 2.60 −17.87 −20.87 −7.62 −10.94 −8.23 −12.00 −10.25 −9.93 −9.64 −8.87
   (0.76) (−7.06) (<0.001)     (−1.78) (0.085) (−2.28) (0.033)
188 30 57.31 −2.15 −25.48 −25.85 −8.22 −14.96 −9.96 −10.23 −17.26 −10.89 −15.52 −15.62
   (−0.47) (−7.93) (<0.001)     (−2.44) (0.025) (−3.00) (0.001)
172 36 71.64 −5.95 −29.04 −32.05 −14.81 −27.78 −9.53 −13.33 −14.23 −4.27 −19.51 −18.72
   (−1.03) (−6.79) (<0.001)     (−2.12) (0.131) (−2.90) (0.001)
155 42 81.88 −8.38 −28.69 −31.75 −19.93 −25.47 −6.96 −14.09 −8.76 −6.28 −21.73 −17.66
   (−1.21) (−5.92) (0.001)     (−1.11) (0.278) (−2.67) (0.001)
135 48 87.32 −16.80 −33.86 −41.06 −22.67 −22.10 −14.22 −24.13 −11.19 −18.96 −19.64 −16.93
   (−1.92) (−5.68) (<0.001)     (−1.00) (0.094) (−1.82) (0.016)
120 54 100.41 −14.29 −36.54 −58.75 −35.98 −44.14 −21.35 −33.56 −0.56 15.39 −15.19 4.81
   (−1.33) (−3.97) (<0.001)     (−0.02) (0.501) (−1.07) (0.022)
108 60 101.35 −26.81 −47.48 −68.72 −36.86 −43.65 −19.79 −27.89 −10.62 −25.07 −24.74 −38.54
   (−1.61) (−3.41) (<0.001)     (−0.27) (0.025) (−1.39) (<0.001)
Panel (c): Number of firms surviving to end of sample period      
Survive thru month Firms in thrift sample Firms in control Group 1 Firms in control Group 2   
6 221 218  215   
12 221 213  205    
18 219 190  185    
24 207 170  170    
30 188 154  153    
36 172 138  136    
42 155 123  127    
48 135 116  118    
54 120 107  109    
60 108 99  107
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in Table 4, indicate that the sample of converted thrifts continues 
to earn excess positive returns for the six months after the IPO. 
These returns are statistically significant relative to the two con-
trol groups, but insignificant when measured relative the SNL In-
dex. The excess returns over the [7, 12] month sub-period are not 
significantly different from zero.
The most striking results from Table 4 are the excess returns 
over the [13, 18], [19, 24], and [25, 30] month sub-periods. The av-
erage (median) thrift underperforms the SNL Index by 4.71% 
(6.53%), 5.39% (6.31%) and 2.90% (3.90%) in these three periods, 
respectively. The magnitude of the underperformance is slightly 
larger relative to either of the control groups. These returns are 
consistent with correction of earlier investor overreaction. Inter-
estingly, the time-horizon over which this mean-reversion occurs 
is roughly the same as the mean-reversion horizon associated with 
the momentum effect first documented by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993).
Taken together, the results in Table 3 and Table 4 indicate over-
reaction in the first day of trading (evidenced by negative cumula-
tive post-IPO returns in Table 3), with some evidence of overreac-
tion during the immediate post-conversion period (evidenced by 
the positive sub-period return in the sub-period 5 days, 6 months). 
This overreaction largely corrects itself over the subsequent 24-
month period, after which time the abnormal returns on converted 
thrifts not significantly different from zero.
4. Controlling for risk of converted thrifts
4.1. Risk-adjusted excess returns
Buy-and-hold cumulative returns are valid performance met-
rics only when the sample of firms has the same risk as the bench-
mark. To control for possible differences in risk between our sam-
ple of thrifts and the SNL Index and control groups, we examine 
alphas from CAPM, 3-factor and 4-factor models. We also con-
sider several additional factors designed to capture the interest 
rate exposure of the thrift industry. To capture the direct effect of 
interest rate exposure, we follow Flannery and James (1984) and 
use the percentage change in yield-relative calculated from yields 
on 7-year US Treasury securities.21 We also use the percentage 
change in the SNL Thrift Index to capture the indirect effect of in-
terest rate exposure, as well as any other exposures to latent in-
dustry-specific factors. In all models, the CRSP value-weighted in-
dex is used as a proxy for the market return.
We analyze alphas both for individual thrifts and a portfo-
lio of thrifts. First, we form a portfolio of newly converted thrifts, 
and calculate the alphas on this portfolio. A thrift remains in the 
portfolio for 3 years after conversion, or until it no longer exists, 
whichever is sooner. Each month, the portfolio return is calculated 
as the value-weighted average of returns on all thrifts in the port-
folio. This produces a monthly time-series of returns, which we 
regress on the specified set of factors.
Table 5 presents the results for factor model regressions on a 
portfolio of newly converted thrifts. We report the 5-factor model 
results only for the SNL Index, since the factor loadings on the 
SNL Index are statistically significant while yield-relative are sta-
tistically insignificant in all models. This is consistent with the re-
sults of Schuermann and Stiroh (2006, p. 3), who examine numer-
ous factor models and find that “including additional risk factors 
(relative to the CAPM) typically generates only a modest gain, and 
when there are substantial gains (in R2) it is not from adding inter-
est rate factors thought to be relevant to bank returns, but instead 
from adding the familiar Fama-French factors, HML and SMB.” 
21 Flannery and James (1984) fit an AR(3) process to the yield relative time-series and use the resulting residuals as a measure of unanticipated 
changes in interest rates. They also analyze the actual changes in the yield relative, and report similar results for both measures.
Table 4. Post-IPO sub-period returns for converting thrifts. All reported returns are for individual 6 month post-IPO sub-periods and exclude the first five trading days after the IPO. The left 
section of the table reports mean buy-and-hold returns for converted thrifts and mean abnormal returns relative to the CRSP value-weighed index for individual 6 month post-IPO sub-periods. 
The middle section reports mean and median buy-and-hold abnormal returns relative to the SNL Thrift Index for the sample of converted thrifts and for the two control groups described in 
the text. The right section reports the mean and median abnormal returns for the sample of converted thrifts relative to each of the control groups. Buy-and-hold returns are calculated for 
each firm that survives to the beginning of the stated sub-period, and cross-sectional means or medians are reported. T-statistics are in parentheses for means and differences in means; for 
individual medians, parentheses contain p-values from a Sign test for difference from zero; for differences in medians, parentheses contain two-sided p-values from a Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
for differences in medians.
                                                                          BHARS (vs. SNL Index)                                                                                          IPO BHAR minus Control BHAR
N           Holding        IPO              IPO              IPO              IPO               Control 1      Control 1       Control 2      Control 2         IPO minus     IPO minus      IPO minus    IPO minus
              period          BHAR          minus           minus           minus            minus SNL   minus SNL    minus SNL   minus SNL     Control 1       Control 1        Control 2      Control 2
              thru              (mean)         market         SNL             SNL               (mean)         (median)       (mean)         (median)         (mean)           (median)        (mean)         (median)
              month            (%)             (mean)         (mean)        (median)         (%)              (%)                (%)                 (%)                 (%)                (%)                (%)               (%)
                                                       (%)               (%)               (%)   
221 5d–6 13.31 5.28 1.15 −1.14 −4.07 −3.95 −2.12 −2.72 5.22 2.81 3.27 1.57
   (4.80) (1.23) (0.224)     (2.67) (0.003) (1.93) (0.107)
221 7–12 14.20 3.95 0.44 −0.97 0.70 −1.27 −1.19 −2.63 −0.26 0.30 1.63 1.66
   (3.53) (0.45) (0.346)     (−0.12) (0.595) (0.86) (0.099)
221 13–18 10.44 −0.12 −4.71 −6.53 2.22 −1.34 0.46 −2.96 −6.93 −5.19 −5.17 −3.57
   (−0.11) (−4.44) (<0.001)     (−3.39) (<0.001) (−2.75) (0.010)
219 19–24 6.47 −4.15 −5.39 −6.31 −0.56 −1.24 1.60 −0.27 −4.83 −5.07 −6.99 −6.04
   (−3.52) (−5.60) (<0.001)     (−2.49) (0.007) (−3.51) (0.001)
207 25–30 7.61 0.30 −2.90 −3.90 1.47 −0.94 2.10 0.97 −4.37 −2.96 −5.00 −4.87
   (0.21) (−2.58) (0.003)     (−1.80) (0.116) (−2.79) (0.003)
188 31–36 10.98 2.74 0.14 −0.09 −0.25 −0.67 1.81 1.66 0.39 0.58 −1.67 −1.75
   (1.74) (0.10) (0.827)     (0.16) (0.459) (−0.88) (0.334)
172 37–42 9.82 3.14 2.48 1.30 1.18 −0.34 1.62 −0.87 1.31 1.64 0.86 2.17
   (1.74) (1.79) (0.253)     (0.49) (0.240) (0.42) (0.465)
155 43–48 4.97 −0.69 −1.75 −0.97 3.57 2.43 −1.66 −0.94 −5.32 −3.40 −0.09 −0.02
   (−0.35) (−1.17) (0.335)     (−1.82) (0.064) (−0.04) (0.974)
135 49–54 9.77 7.74 0.54 −0.47 −1.01 −1.68 0.20 0.56 1.55 1.22 0.34 −1.03
   (3.10) (0.31) (1.000)     (0.43) (0.398) (0.12) (0.961)
120 55–60 2.71 1.82 −0.50 −0.86 4.08 3.40 0.19 0.83 −4.58 −4.25 −0.69 −1.68
   (0.75) (−0.33) (0.315)     (−1.50) (0.155) (−0.27) (0.579)
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This lack of explanatory power for interest rate factors contrasts 
with the earlier results of Flannery and James (1984). One possi-
ble explanation for the reduced sensitivity of thrift returns to in-
terest rate changes is that banks and thrifts today are better able 
to manage interest rate risk exposure through derivative markets 
that barely existed when Flannery and James (1984) conducted 
their study.
The first notable result in Panel (a) is that the estimated market 
factor loadings are less than one in all models. This suggests that 
the sample of thrifts, as a group, have less systematic risk than the 
average stock. The loadings on SMB and HML are large, but con-
sistent with the small average size of converted thrifts (the average 
IPO in our sample raised approximately $54.8 million), as well as 
the high book-to-market values that result from the appraisal pro-
cess described above. The addition of the Carhart (1997) momen-
tum factor bolsters the 3-factor model to explain cross-sectional 
variation in momentum-sorted portfolio returns, and is included 
to ensure that we control for possible exposure to a momentum 
factor; however, the thrifts do not appear to have any momen-
tum factor exposure.22 The SNL index factor is positive (0.323) and 
highly significant. The fifth-factor loading indicates that the newly 
converted thrifts have less systematic risk than their seasoned coun-
terparts. This result is consistent with Esty (1997), who finds that 
firm risk increases after conversion as managers rationally respond 
to the incentives embedded in the stock form of ownership.23
Also notable are the alphas, which are positive and highly sig-
nificant for all four models (1.3% monthly in CAPM, 0.9% monthly 
in 3-factor and 4-factor models, and 0.8% in 5-factor model). These 
alphas are consistent with the positive long-run BHARS relative to 
the market reported in Panel (a) of Table 3.24 The alphas are also 
consistent with the superior thrift industry performance over the 
sample period. At the same time, their large magnitude suggests 
a possible omitted variable and thus they should be interpreted 
cautiously.
Therefore, for comparison purposes we also estimate alphas 
for both control groups, and report the results in Panels (b) and 
(c). The estimated factor loadings are nearly identical to the esti-
mated factor loadings for the sample firms, suggesting that the 
risk characteristics of the control groups closely mirror those of 
the converting thrifts. Alpha is positive and highly significant for 
all models (1.5% monthly in CAPM, 1.1% monthly in 3-factor and 4-
factor models and 1.0% monthly in 5-factor model). We calculate 
and report the difference in alpha between the sample firms con-
trol groups. In all cases, the converting thrift alphas are 10–20 basis 
points lower than the control group alphas. This suggests that our 
sample firms underperformed with respect to the control groups, 
though none of the differences is statistically significant. This may 
be due to low power, or may indicate that controlling for risk-
characteristics explains the buy-and-hold return differences.
To further analyze the risk-adjusted returns, we estimate our 
factor models separately for each firm over the 3-year post-IPO 
period to obtain firm-level parameter estimates. Table 6, Panel (a) 
reports the cross-sectional averages for the estimated monthly pa-
rameters. Once again, alphas are statistically and economically 
significant, across all models. Panel (b) reports the control group 
alphas and differences for all models. Again, converting thrift al-
phas are lower than control group alphas for all models. Six of the 
eight differences are significant at the 10% level, and three of the 
eight are significant at the 5% level. The qualitative results of Ta-
ble 5 and Table 6 indicate that even after controlling for risk expo-
sure, the converted thrifts have negative risk-adjusted long-run re-
turns. This finding is consistent with investor overreaction in the 
initial days of trading following the IPO.
To analyze the risk-adjusted sub-period performance, we re-
run daily cross-sectional regressions for converting thrifts and 
22 This does not necessarily imply that the converted thrifts do not experience price momentum. Rather, it simply means that the returns on the thrift 
portfolio are uncorrelated with the returns on a more broadly-based portfolio of stocks whose selection is based upon extreme recent returns.
23 Also consistent with this, Iannotta et al. (2007) find that mutual banks have better loan quality and lower asset risk than private or public sector 
banks in the European banking industry. Because the IPO increases available cash and therefore the overall liquidity of thrift assets, it might ap-
pear to be risk-reducing. However, Wagner (2007) finds that increases in bank asset liquidity result in banks taking on new risk that more than 
offsets the positive effects of the liquidity increase, thereby increasing overall risk.
24 In panel (b) of Table 3, we reported that long-run BHARS are negative for the subsample of firms that survive to the end of the sample period. 
Since the regression results in Table 5 include all thrifts, they are directly comparable only to the results in Panel (a) of Table 3.
Table 5. Cumulative long-run alphas for portfolio of converting thrifts. Table reports 
estimated parameters from a regression of thrift portfolio return on a set of factors. Alpha is 
reported as a decimal. MKT is the market return minus the risk free rate; SMB and HML are 
Fama-French size and book-to-market factors, respectively, UMD is a momentum factor, and 
SNL is the return on the SNL thrift index. The portfolio contains thrifts that convert over the 
period 1993–2000, and converted thrifts remain in the portfolio for 3 years, or until the firm 
ceases to exist, whichever occurs first. Each month, the portfolio return is calculated as the 
value-weighted average of return on all thrifts in the portfolio. Alpha Diff. equals control group 
alpha minus Thrift IPO alpha. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Parameters CAPM 3-Factor 4-Factor 5-Factor (SNL)
Panel (a): Thrift IPO regressions
Alpha 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.008
 (4.41) (3.60) (3.31) (3.38)
MKT 0.282 0.528 0.527 0.207
 (4.33) (7.51) (7.53) (2.58)
SMB  0.385 0.387 0.301
  (5.44) (5.47) (4.76)
HML  0.559 0.560 0.238
  (6.30) (6.30) (2.54)
UMD   0.038 0.034
   (0.82) (0.83)
SNL    0.323
    (6.11)
R2 (%) 13.71 38.12 38.48 53.66
Panel (b): Control Group 1 regressions
Alpha 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.010
 (4.57) (3.78) (3.77) (3.75)
MKT 0.307 0.509 0.502 0.169
 (4.37) (6.65) (6.40) (1.83)
SMB  0.386 0.383 0.296
  (4.82) (4.75) (3.99)
HML  0.521 0.518 0.185
  (5.21) (5.17) (1.71)
UMD   −0.022 −0.028
   (−0.42) (−0.61)
SNL    0.343
    (5.52)
R2 (%) 13.32 31.90 32.00 45.79
Alpha Diff. −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
 (−0.45) (−0.52) (−0.50) (−0.56)
Panel (c): Control Group 2 regressions
Alpha 0.015 0.010 0.011 0.010
 (4.51) (3.56) (3.63) (3.67)
MKT 0.333 0.582 0.570 0.194
 (4.63) (7.64) (7.30) (2.19)
SMB  0.382 0.378 0.279
  (4.80) (4.70) (3.93)
HML  0.619 0.615 0.238
  (6.21) (6.14) (2.29)
UMD   −0.040 −0.047
   (−0.76) (−1.05)
SNL    0.389
    (6.52)
R2 (%) 14.73 36.55 36.85 53.39
Alpha Diff. −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
 (−0.40) (−0.39) (−0.49) (−0.45)
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control groups over each post-IPO sub-period, and report the av-
erage daily alphas in Table 7.25 We only report the alphas from 
a 5-factor model (the results from models with fewer factors are 
qualitatively similar, and slightly stronger). Converting thrifts’ av-
erage daily alphas range from a low of 2.0 basis points in the [43, 
48] month interval to a high of 8.3 basis points in the [7, 12] month 
interval. Alpha is positive in all sub-periods and highly significant 
in all but two sub-periods. In addition, we report the difference in 
alpha between converting thrifts and both control groups for all 
sub-periods. As with the BHARS analysis, the evidence in Table 
7 suggests that the negative abnormal returns are concentrated in 
the [13, 30] month period, though the noise in the data prevents us 
from making any strong statements about statistical significance.
4.2. Firm size and interpretation of results
Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981), and Fama and French (1992) 
present evidence that firm size influences returns. Thus, we sort 
our sample of converting thrifts into small and large firms based 
on inflation adjusted market-capitalizations calculated on De-
cember 31 of each firm’s IPO year. Table 8 reports cumulative 
BHARS for the size-based portfolios, while Table 9 reports sub-
period BHARS. Since the underperformance in Table 4 was less 
pronounced relative to the SNL Index than the control groups, we 
report the size-based results relative to the SNL Index. Results rel-
ative to the control groups, omitted for brevity, are qualitatively 
similar and slightly larger in magnitude.
As shown in Table 8, the underperformance is largely concen-
trated in the smallest half of firms in our sample. The cumula-
tive long-run abnormal returns for the largest thrifts are not sig-
nificantly different from zero. This finding contrasts with Houge 
and Loughran (1999) who found large banks performed signifi-
cantly worse than small banks. One possible explanation is that 
our sample includes only converted thrifts (which are initially un-
derpriced), while in their sample thrifts are included along with 
banks and bank holding companies, neither of which have under-
pricing automatically built-in to the IPO price.
In Table 9, we report buy-and-hold excess returns for 6 month 
interim periods over the post-IPO sample. The small firms’ sub-
periods returns are negative for all but one period, but statisti-
cally significant only over the [13, 18], [19, 24], and [25, 30] (me-
dian only) month periods. Interestingly, the sub-period returns 
for the largest firms are also significantly negative over the same 
three sub-periods, though these negative returns are largely offset 
by subsequent positive returns.
Because our sample of converting thrifts consists primarily of 
smaller firms, the results which utilize daily return data may be 
biased due to nonsynchronous trading. However, we also exam-
ine performance utilizing monthly data. Comparison between the 
daily and monthly results indicates that the results are largely the 
same whether daily or monthly returns are used. Since the impact 
of nonsynchronous trading on monthly returns is minimal (Scho-
les and Williams, 1977), this suggests that nonsynchronous trad-
ing is not a significant factor in our results.
Taken together, our results suggest that investor overreaction 
drives prices above fundamental value on the initial day of trad-
ing, that this overreaction continues for at least 6 months, then 
corrects between 18 and 30 months after the IPO. These price dy-
namics are most consistent with the empirical predictions of Dan-
iel et al. (1998), and are also most pronounced for the smallest 
firms in our sample. Our results are also broadly consistent with 
the model of Miller (1977) in which heterogeneous beliefs about 
stock returns leads to overvaluation in the presence of short-sales 
constraints.26 This overvaluation theory predicts that the greater 
the divergence of opinion, the greater the overvaluation and the 
lower the realized future returns. It is quite plausible to assume 
short-sales are difficult or expensive, given the small size and high 
insider ownership of the thrifts in our sample. While the thrift in-
dustry is highly regulated and transparent, if belief differences are 
strongest among the small thrifts, then our empirical results are 
also consistent with Miller (1977).
25 Because these sub-periods involve only 6 months, we do not run firm-level regressions with monthly returns.
26 We thank an anonymous referee for this insight.
Table 6. Cumulative long-run alphas: cross-sectional averages. Table reports cross-
sectional average parameters from firm-level regressions of monthly thrift return on a set 
of factors. Alpha is reported as a decimal. MKT is the market return minus the risk free rate; 
SMB and HML are Fama-French size and book-to-market factors, respectively, UMD is a 
momentum factor, and SNL is the return on the SNL thrift index, minus the risk free rate. 
Parameters are estimated separately for each firm over the 3-year post-IPO period. Cross-
sectional t-statistics for the mean parameters are reported in parentheses. Panel (b) reports 
cross-sectional average alphas from the same regressions using control group returns.
Parameters                CAPM                 3-Factor               4-Factor                 5-Factor
Panel (a): Thrift IPO regressions
Alpha  0.008  0.006  0.006  0.006
 (9.38)  (6.59)  (6.54)  (7.11)
MKT  0.450  0.747  0.755  0.034
 (16.35)  (21.99)  (22.24)  (0.74)
SMB   0.409  0.417  0.210
  (16.47)  (18.16)  (6.61)
HML   0.805  0.799  0.158
  (19.68)  (18.16)  (3.03)
UMD    –0.019  0.063
   (–0.58)  (2.10)
SNL     0.521
    (14.47)
Average R2 (%)  11.42  21.64  24.11  31.38
Panel (b): Control group alphas
Control 1 Alpha  0.012  0.008  0.007  0.007
 (8.04)  (5.54)  (4.04)  (4.01)
Thrift IPO minus  –0.003  –0.003  –0.001  –0.001
Control 1  (–1.99)  (–1.65)  (–0.75)  (–0.71)
Control 2 Alpha  0.013  0.009  0.009  0.009
 (9.64)  (6.75)  (5.84)  (5.89)
Thrift IPO minus  –0.004  –0.003  –0.003  –0.003
Control 2  (–2.75)  (–2.17)  (–1.72)  (–1.68)
Table 7. Post-IPO Sub-period daily alphas: cross-sectional averages. Table reports cross-
sectional average alphas from firm-level regressions of daily thrift return on the following 
factors: MKT is the market return minus the risk free rate; SMB and HML are Fama-French 
size and book-to-market factors, respectively; UMD is a momentum factor; and SNL is 
the return on the SNL thrift index, minus the risk free rate. Alpha is reported as a decimal. 
Parameters are estimated separately for each firm over the specified post-IPO sub-period. 
Cross-sectional t-statistics for the mean alpha parameters are reported in the last column.
Period        IPO Daily      t-stat             IPO minus    t-stat.            IPO minus    t-stat.
(months)    Alpha                                 Control 1                           Control 2
                   (mean)                              (mean)                              (mean)
   0.00016  0.92  –0.00002  –0.17
  7–12  0.00083  11.54  –0.00005  –0.23  –0.00006  –0.39
13–18  0.00049  6.40  –0.00136  –1.78  –0.00007  –0.23
19–24  0.00041  3.84  –0.00023  –1.41  –0.00098  –1.14
25–30  0.00052  4.40  –0.00040  –1.56  –0.00019  –1.23
31–36  0.00070  7.44  0.00000  0.00  0.00025  1.64
37–42  0.00060  4.82  0.00029  0.69  0.00024  1.55
43–48  0.00020  1.27  –0.00042  –1.72  0.00017  0.62
49–54  0.00057  3.96  –0.00008  –0.28  –0.00008  –0.37
55–60  0.00072  1.79  –0.00020  –0.44  0.00030  1.45
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5. Conclusion
We study long-run return properties of a unique set of 221 
thrifts that converted from mutual to stock form between 1993 
and 2000. Our sample of firms is uniquely suited for examining in-
vestor behavior because we know that the average firm is initially 
underpriced. Thus, any long-run negative returns unambiguously 
result from investor behavior that drives prices above fundamen-
tal value at some point after the IPO.
We find that after removing the large first-day returns, convert-
ing thrifts have negative long-run cumulative abnormal returns 
when measured at horizons of 2–5 years. This is consistent with 
investor behavior on the initial day of trading that drives prices 
above fundamental value. We also examine abnormal returns over 
various sub-periods for evidence of investor overreaction at any 
time after the IPO. We find that the thrift returns are positive for 
up to 6 months post-IPO and insignificant in the [7,12] month pe-
riod, which suggests that prices remain above fundamental value 
for up to a year following the IPO.
Beginning in year two, abnormal returns are significantly nega-
tive, indicating a reversion of price to fundamental value. This re-
version is concentrated in the [13, 30] month period, after which 
point abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero. 
This finding is strongest for the smallest firms in the sample, but 
Table 8. Cumulative BHARs for portfolios sorted by size. Table reports the average buy-and-hold returns for size-based portfolios of converted thrifts relative to the SNL Thrift Index. Firms 
are sorted based upon inflation adjusted post-IPO market capitalization. The average abnormal return for each firm is calculated by subtracting the cumulative benchmark return from the firm’s 
cumulative return. The cross-sectional average abnormal returns are reported in the table. T-statistics are in parentheses for means; for medians, parentheses contain p-values from a Sign 
test for difference from zero.
Thru month        N             Small firms                                                                                                  N             Large firms
                                          IPO minus SNL Index (Mean) (%)   IPO minus SNL Index (Median) (%)                   IPO minus SNL Index (Mean) (%)      IPO minus SNL Index (Median) (%)
 6  110  –0.67  –4.33  111  2.97  1.86
  (–0.47)  (0.001)   (2.51)  (0.255)
12  110  –0.19  –3.44  111  3.19  0.40
  (–0.10)  (0.152)   (1.82)  (0.850)
18  110  –7.90  –10.30  111  –2.46  –6.47
  (–2.72)  (0.001)   (–0.87)  (0.008)
24  110  –20.63  –23.91  111  –6.27  –10.38
  (–5.67)  (<0.001)   (–1.62)  (0.008)
30  110  –25.20  –24.14  111  –9.63  –12.68
  (–5.67)  (<0.001)   (–2.06) (<0.001)
36  110  –27.67  –27.01  111  –5.98  –18.84
  (–4.79)  (<0.001)   (–1.04) (0.013)
42  110  –29.81  –29.69  111  2.69  –14.25
  (–5.00)  (<0.001)   (0.43)  (0.087)
48  110  –31.30  –34.71  111  2.96  –9.78
  (–4.54)  (<0.001)   (0.42)  (0.129)
54  110  –30.34  –39.91  111  3.15  –6.05
  (–3.14)  (<0.001)   (0.41)  (0.343)
60 110  –30.54  –38.68  111  2.38  –8.25
  (–2.44)  (<0.001)   (0.29)  (0.569)
Table 9. Sub-period BHARs for portfolios sorted by size. Table reports the average buy-and-hold returns over 6 month post-IPO sub-periods for size-based portfolios of converted thrifts 
relative to the SNL Thrift Index. Firms are sorted based upon inflation adjusted post-IPO market capitalization. Buy-and-hold returns are calculated for each firm that survives to the beginning 
of the stated sub-period, and cross-sectional averages are reported. The average abnormal return for each firm is calculated by subtracting the benchmark return from the firm’s return. The 
cross-sectional average abnormal returns are reported in the table. T-statistics are in parentheses for means and differences in means; for medians, parentheses contain p-values from a Sign 
test for difference from zero.
Sub-period        N             Small firms                                                                                                  N             Large firms
                                          IPO minus SNL Index (Mean) (%)   IPO minus SNL Index (Median) (%)                   IPO minus SNL Index (Mean) (%)      IPO minus SNL Index (Median) (%)
5d–6 110  –0.67  –4.33  111  2.97  1.86
  (–0.47)  (0.001)   (2.51)  (0.255)
7–12  110  0.75  –1.71  111  0.12 –0.86
  (0.49)  (0.634)   (0.10)  (0.448)
13–18  110  –5.23  –5.48  111  –4.20  –7.23
  (–3.51)  (<0.001)   (–2.77)  (<0.001)
19–24  109  –8.21  –8.04  110  –2.59  –1.69
  (–6.03)  (<0.001)   (–1.97)  (0.294)
25–30  101  –1.79  –2.47  105  –3.97  –5.93
  (–1.12)  (0.046)   (–2.48)  (0.031)
31–36  90  –0.39  –1.96  98  0.62  0.84
  (–0.20)  (0.461)   (0.33)  (0.762)
37–42  82  –1.84  –1.28  90  6.40  3.03
  (–0.92)  (0.581)   (3.48)  (0.026)
43–48  73  –3.83  –3.51  82  0.11  –0.10
  (–1.52)  (0.160)   (0.06)  (1.000)
49–54  68  –0.02  0.18  67  1.11  –0.87
  (–0.01)  (0.904)   (0.47)  (0.807)
55–60  60  –1.25  –0.95  60  0.25  –0.86
  (–0.60)  (0.519)   (0.11)  (0.519)
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is significant for the large thrifts as well. We also measure risk-ad-
justed abnormal performance by using a number of factor mod-
els. While the statistical significance of these results is somewhat 
weaker, they also demonstrate that the long-run abnormal returns 
are negative, and that the poor performance is concentrated in the 
second and third years following the IPO. The documented price 
patterns are consistent with the empirical predictions of Daniel et 
al. (1998), and are most pronounced for the smallest firms in our 
sample.
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